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Introduction 
 
As her title indicates, Marianne de Laet suggests that social epistemology could be 
thought of as anthropology, in terms of how this mode of knowing has helped flesh out 
the social dimensions of scientific knowledge. She does so firstly, by accounting for how 
anthropological methods and concepts have contributed to science and technology studies 
(STS) by providing an alternative to “believing the natives” i.e., scientists, hence 
challenging positivist and objectivist accounts of science.  She then specifies selected 
analytical insights of anthropology. The concepts ‘culture’ and ‘practice’, she argues, 
enable us to learn how “knowledge is social in an epistemic sense” (2012, 421). She 
concludes her argument by questioning the distinction between epistemology and 
ontology, maintaining that anthropology is social epistemology. 
 
De Laet touches several key debates in the history of STS and much of her commentary 
on the sociality of knowledge is difficult to disagree with. There are however, also some 
elements in her argument with which I wish to engage critically. These include the 
relationship between anthropology and STS and the relationship between the concepts of 
culture and ontology. I will do so by drawing my inspiration from a contemporary a 
debate across STS and anthropology that — like de Laet — regards entanglements of 
epistemology and ontology, practice, and materiality. This project is also known as post-
ANT and empirical philosophy in STS (Mol 2002; Gad and Bruun Jensen 2010, 55-80; 
Law and Hassard 1999) and lateral, multi-natural and ontological engagements in 
anthropology (Maurer 2005; Riles 2000; Strathern 2004 [1991]; Carrithers et al. 2010, 
152-200; Viveiros de Castro 2004, 463-484). De Laet mentions some of the same sources. 
 
I will focus my commentary on these debates’ implications for the concept of culture and 
“our terminological tinkering” (2012, 420). My aim is to provide a different account of 
what anthropology has to offer STS and, as a consequence, to keep some interesting 
tensions open between the conceptual and the empirical, between “us” and “them”, which 
I believe de Laet resolves too quickly. 
 
Culture and ontology 
 
De Laet characterizes anthropology’s main contribution to STS as providing an 
alternative account of science to that of the scientists. As she writes, “[o]ur 
terminological tinkering – refusing to adopt the terms of the actors – is, then, also an 
epistemological tinkering; we account of these practices in terms of our own” (2012, 419). 
She characterizes this anthropological tinkering as necessary (2012, 419). In this way, 
studying science becomes a question of choosing between ‘our’ or ‘their’ terms. 
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STS to a great degree evolved around the ambition of providing alternative accounts of 
science than dominant positivist accounts emphasizing its neutrality and objectivity. The 
early laboratory studies, as de Laet also notes, illustrated the cultural aspects of science, 
rendering it situated in contingent and socio-material practices rather than neutral and 
universal (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Knorr-Cetina 1999). In that regard, de Laet’s 
account of anthropology’s early influence on STS is easy to agree with. However, given 
her aim is to engage in a general discussion of how anthropology — not only influences 
STS — but is social epistemology, the stakes are raised.  
 
This invites the question of whether analyzing science through the concept of culture is 
still an adequate ambition for STS. It has been argued that STS research, through 
privileging the genre of case studies, has already spent considerable time reiterating the 
contingent and cultural aspects of science, at the cost of empirical-conceptual innovation 
(Beaulieu, Scharnhorst, and Wouters 2007, 672-692). Insofar as this is the case, it is 
important to draw inspiration from current debates across anthropology and STS 
regarding exactly the tensions that de Laet also grapples with (culture vs. ontology; our 
vs. their terms; strange vs. familiar). 
 
Unfortunately, we learn little from these debates in de Laet’s article as anthropology is 
somewhat homogenized, firstly through the prevalence of the concept of culture, and later 
that of practice. However, anthropology, as I will argue below, is a heterogeneous project. 
Recognizing this not only makes it hard to claim that “anthropology is social 
epistemology”, but also invites empirical-conceptual innovation as opposed to affirming 
that science is culture (in culture). 
 
At least since the crisis of representation in the 1980’s, anthropology has critiqued and 
deconstructed the concept of culture (Wagner 1981; Liep and Olwig 1994, 7-21), yet de 
Laet emphasizes this concept as a central contribution from anthropology to STS. While 
she does hint at some problematic aspects of the concept (2012, 422), she writes that it is 
“effective: it works” (2012, 422). The question is ‘for whom’ and ‘in which way’. For de 
Laet, it ‘works’ in relation to teaching her engineer students to look differently at science 
and discover its social aspects. While this pedagogical contribution is undoubtedly 
important I do not think that it does full justice to the question of how anthropology has 
inspired (and continues to inspire) STS.   
 
The recent anthropological debate about the distinction between ontology and culture 
provides such inspiration (Carrithers et al. 2010, 152-200; Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 
2007). This debate is especially interesting considering how de Laet herself emphasizes 
both concepts. The anthropological debate regards to what extent an ‘ontological turn’ in 
anthropology also means ‘turning away from’ culture. The argument is more or less that 
culture is an epistemological approach, tending to questions of representation and 
knowledge of ‘one world’, whereas an ontological approach takes as its starting point that 
multiple realities or worlds exist (Carrithers et al. 2010). Anthropologists thus usually 
introduce the term of ontology (or rather, ontologies) in opposition to culture. As 
anthropologist Matthei Candea writes, depicting this turn, “the study of culture is cast as 
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merely the study of meaning and interpretation, of people’s episteme” (Carrithers et al. 
2010, 173). Anthropology, in this stream of argument is neither a question of “writing 
culture” (cf. Clifford and Marcus 1986) nor of “applying analytical concepts to 
ethnographic data” (Holbraad 2010, 180). As I will discuss to below, the ontological turn 
entails different implications for anthropological concepts. Although this turn to ontology 
has (unsurprisingly) been criticized for reducing the richness of the concept of culture 
(Carrithers et al. 2010), the difference between these two concepts is nevertheless an 
important anthropological debate, a difference that is somewhat concealed in de Laet’s 
account. 
 
A similar point can be made about de Laet’s comment on anthropology and practice. In 
her conclusion, she detects a shift in “anthropological renderings” towards seeing 
“knowing emerge as practice, and anthropological inquiry as an investigation of how 
knowing is done” (2012, 429, her emphasis). This she claims, is what “anthropologists 
have been doing … for a very long time” (2012, 430). Interestingly, several 
anthropologists actually criticize (practice studies) in STS for this exact move: if 
everything is seen as “practice”, informants’ own thinking and agency may be 
downplayed (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007; Holbraad 2004, 1-27; Miyazaki 2013; 
Strathern 2011, 87-103).  
 
In sum, I do not think that a general anthropological position exists — certainly not in 
connection to the question of how culture is related to ontology or what the implications 
and importance are of practice studies.  
 
Ontologizing epistemology 
 
To be fair, when de Laet actually makes references to “ontology”, she does so not 
through anthropologists but through philosopher and STS scholar Annemarie Mol’s 
‘empirical philosophy’, which entails a somewhat different concept of ontology than the 
current ontological turn in anthropology (Gad, Jensen, and Winthereik 2014, 1-24). 
However, comments are also warranted on the relationship between Mol’s “version” of 
ontology and the concept of culture.  
 
In addition to the fact that Mol criticizes the concept of culture (Mol 2002), her empirical 
philosophy, with its focus on ontology, has implications for whether we can see empirical 
philosophy as “social epistemology”. De Laet actually raises this question herself, asking 
whether “an empirical turn in philosophy asks us to rethink the use of the word 
epistemology” but, unfortunately, refrains from providing an answer (“I leave it up to you 
to decide”) (2012, 430). 
 
Mol’s empirical philosophy would indeed demand such rethinking, as it entails 
“ontologizing epistemology.” When she suggests to understand ontologies (in plural) as a 
practical and dynamic phenomena, this assumes neither “ultimate categories of being 
below, [n]or abstract metaphysical principles above, world(s)” but instead, worlds being 
created by socio-material practices that can be studied ethnographically (Gad, Jensen, and 
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Winthereik 2014, 1-24). This suggests —  metaphysically, ethnographically and 
conceptually — something rather different than de Laet’s account of reflexive 
relationships “between structure and agency” (2012, 422) and between “science is 
culture” and “science in culture” (2012, 424). Empirical philosophy does not invite 
“drawing things together into a coherent whole [culture] and thereby differentiating them 
from others” (Mol 2002, 77), nor does it invite “traditional scales in which the local is 
part of something larger” (Mol 2002, 80). These analytical differences are important, 
insofar as one commits to empirical philosophy.  
 
Our vs. their terms 
 
Now, let’s go back to anthropology. The above-mentioned debate about the relationship 
between culture and ontology also regards the role of the “natives’” accounts and terms. 
This matter it is not merely a question of choosing between “emic” or “etic” approaches, 
as de Laet suggests, but a classic conundrum in anthropology that continues to engage 
scholars in interesting debates about what anthropology is and how it should engage with 
(and be transformed by) ‘the empirical’.  
 
Quite a few anthropologists currently argue for the need to ‘take seriously’ ones 
interlocutors (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 2-33; Walford 2013). Now, ‘taking seriously’ is a 
question of neither naively believing what ‘they say’ nor using the concept of culture as 
an explanatory device (Holbraad in Carrithers et al. 2010, 152-200). Indeed, according to 
these scholars, what we study is not even necessarily a question of culture (Viveiros de 
Castro 2004, 137-156). Thus, ‘taking seriously’ is a way to disturb conceptual resources 
such as ‘culture’, allowing for conceptual innovation but also for enhancing our 
knowledge of multiple worlds (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007). Indeed, if reality is 
multiple, as de Laet suggests (2012, 429), then concepts such as culture are a very 
singular take on that world, these anthropologists would argue.  
 
One could object that ‘taking seriously’ the natives may be the case for traditional 
‘exotic’ and ‘Other’ field sites and not the study objects of STS, (often) situated in Euro-
American contexts. It is somewhat unclear where de Laet positions herself in relation to 
this issue. While she acknowledges that “distance is [not] natural” (2012, 423), she 
nevertheless writes that “in STS, we have modified the anthropological propensity to 
make the strange familiar and invented the technique of making the familiar strange” 
(2012, 420). This hints a rather simplistic and settled way of how we look at “difference” 
(it is either “familiar” or “strange”). It is however, an ongoing debate in anthropology 
how near or far it considers its object to be from itself (Riles 2000; Strathern 1987, 16-
37). Social anthropologist Marilyn Strathern, for instance, points to the recursive dynamic 
of how “difference” continues to reinstate itself  “at home” (1987, 16). There may not be 
an a priori need for STS scholars to “mak[e] the familiar strange” in order “to add 
anything to … [their] stories,” as de Laet suggests (2012, 420). Indeed, scholars in both 
anthropology and STS offer alternatives to this dichotomy. Examples include exploring 
the “partial connections” between “our” and “their” terms (Strathern 2004 [1991]; Ratner 
2012; Jensen and Lauritsen 2005, 59-77) and taking encounters of  “difference” or 
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“similarity” as a saliency for our own conceptual givens (Riles 2000; Carrithers et al. 
2010, 152-200; Walford 2013). In other words, such analytical engagements can become 
an invitation to question how we think about the world in a more general sense. 
 
 
 
Studying with  
 
How we approach ‘ours vs. their’ terms also has implications for how we engage with 
those we study. Again, I am uncertain about de Laet’s argument. As discussed, she 
considers STS’ (anthropological) task to “not believe the natives’ but provide our own 
accounts of science. Such an approach is rather asymmetric, claiming that anthropology 
can explicate (social and cultural) aspects of knowledge production to which the 
scientists are blind. Later however, she characterizes the relationship between the 
researcher and researched as a “dance”, “each with agency as to what the final piece will 
entail,” using terms such as “collaboration,” “pedagogy,” and “studying with” rather than 
“of” (2012, 428). When de Laet elaborates on what it means to “study with,” it turns out 
to be the following prerogative: “We must teach the interlocutors what we learn from 
them…[and] respectfully, we adjudicate” (ibid.). We can teach them (and make 
judgments) about “cultural” and “political” “contexts”. This raises the question of what 
we learn from them (obviously, not anything that challenges the conceptual idea that 
“cultural” and “political” contexts provide explanatory frameworks). But should we not 
also challenge ourselves in the same ways as we challenge informants, to explicate and 
discuss our “infra-languages” and concepts, too? While de Laet does mention this 
reflexive aspect of anthropology (2012, 425), it is less clear how (or whether) it relates to 
her idea of “studying with”. 
 
Among anthropologists also engaged in collaborative research, the term collaboration is 
taken to consider informants as “epistemic partners” (Holmes and Marcus 2008, 81-101), 
to avoid a conceptual colonization the informants’ own conceptual work (Carrithers et al. 
2010, 152-200), or to “explor[e] common futures with practices … that would 
simultaneously add more agency to researcher and to practices” (Jensen and Lauritsen 
2005, 72, original emphasis). This has a somewhat different tone than “teaching them” 
and “adjudicating”.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In my response to de Laet’s article, I have refrained from offering a settled version of 
how STS should do anthropology or how anthropology should influence STS. Instead, 
my aim has been to illustrate some of the productive discussions and tensions among 
scholars. I have done so because I believe that they can inspire a continued conceptual-
empirical innovation across STS and anthropology. These debates are already there, 
introduced through terms such as “lateral compatibility” (Ratner 2012), “inter-
reflexivity” (Gad 2012, 367-392), “a non-humanist disposition” (Jensen 2010) and 
“comparative relativisms” (Jensen et al. 2011, 1-12), to mention a few. More than 
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anything, they illustrate that questions regarding the relationship between researcher and 
interlocutors, and also the empirical and the conceptual, are far from resolved. The 
challenge, as I see it, is thus not to take a “truly empirical turn,” as de Laet suggests 
(2012, 430). Instead, keeping these tensions alive may be the most important resources 
we have for posing questions anew about how (scientific) worlds are made, how to 
analyze this making, and how we allow analysis to be a proxy for questioning our own 
conceptual repertoires.  
 
Contact details: hr.lpf@cbs.dk 
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